IT is to avoid the bias consequent on personal experience that the operations which forq thesubject of this slight study of future possibilities are not taken from the European War.
The war is still too near and memories of actual experiences too vivid, also the alterations and improvements in a r m and Armament which are considcrcd in this paper grew up during the war, and opinions were formed during this transition period which sometimes make it hard to appreciate fully the final results.
For example, the officer or man who only served on the Western Front from after the retreat from Mons has had little opportunity of apprcciating the uscs of cavalry or cyclists. Similarly, another whose cxpericnce of tanks is limited to the summer of 1917 in front of Ypres will have a limited view of the powers of the tank.
Further, it is necessary for a satisfactory consideration of future possibilitics t o study a war of movement and not permit oneself to be affected by the abnormal considerations of a war of positions and the conditions in the theatre of war resulting thcrcfrom.
For these reasons the optrations of the Japanese IInd Army from end of May to 15th June, 1904, have been selected for study.
The period is also of interest as affording an examplc of co-operation bctwcen Navy and h y , and the terrain is of sufficiently varying character to afford comparisons. Only sufficient narrative of the actual operations is given to enable each situation to be reviewed in the light of future possibilities, the object being not to attempt to lay down in any way what ought to be done, but rather t o bring out the more probable possibilities,in each situation, and how they can be taken advantage of.
The assumptions required for the consideration of the possibilities arc :-Each of the opposing would have attached :-(a) An adequate Air Service to carry out the tactical reconnaissances.
No reference is made to long distance rcconnaissanccs as this is the duty of G.H.Q. flights. Thcsc fast-moving tanks would a t least be cqual t o and, it is considcrcd a justifiable assumption, supcrior to the present day " Medium C '' tank.
Such improvements would be slightly increased rangc of action on onc refill-ie., 80 or go milcs, with a cross-country speed of miles per hour. Such tanks should be armed with a light gun capable of dealing with hostile tanks, in addition to two Hotchkiss or similar wcapons. v> vechanical transport with the administrative services and of a typc suitable to the country.
Such transport, even at the prescnt moment. could be supplied from vehiclcs of the light box car or tender typc. The experience gained in operations in unsettled and nnorganiscd countries (q., opcrations in East Africa and the Dunstcr Force in Persia) have shown what cxtraordinary difficulties a light vehicle can overcome even in bad wcathcr. Tlien, again, improvementsare daily k i n g made in the evolution of the '' track or pedrail vehicle." Final improvements will probably follow these lines, and a suggested organisation has been gone into in detail in a paper on transport for the administrative services publislicd in the JOURNAL of February, 1921. It must, however, be noticed that, although the mechanical and other improvements have been assumed to be equal, their handling is taken as only of the samc standard as was shown in the actual operations with the weapons then available. The prc-war tactical and other lcssons taught by the operations are not touched on except whcre they affect future possibilities.
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS.
When studying any operations it is of the first importance to rcalise the physical characteristics of the theatre of war.
The Liao Tung Peninsula, in which the 2nd Army w a s operating at this period, lies bctwcen the Liao Tung Gulf and the Korean Bay, and is the S.W. extremity of Manchuria. As a whole, Southern Alan. churia is a hilly country with two pronounced ranges, of which one, the Hsiung Yao Shan, runs down the Liao Tung Pcninsula. In places the hills risc to nearly 4,000 ft., their prccipitous slopcs densely wooded with Arthur runs. Even this, however, was and is extremely difficult country for artillery or large bodies of cavalry, although infantry can traverse most of it. The lower liills throughout Southern Manchuria are generally of the same type-rounded, 300 ft. to 800 ft. high, and covered with extremely dense shrub and small trees. A pronounced characteristic is, however, the sliarp peak or pyramid in which they culminate-this k i n g more pronounced in the higher mountains, but maintained throughout in the spurs.
As regards the vallcys and country generally, every fiat space, Iiowever small, is cultivated with crops of millet, beans and peas. Tlie niille t crop should be especially remcinbcrcd when studying any operations, as by September it has rcached an enormous height. By August it is frequently liiglicr than a horseman's Iiend, and bcing carefully and closely grown in rows is casily transforiiicd by bending down at about 3 ft. high into a difficult obstacle for moiintcd or even dismountcd troops. It would afford even in Junc considcrable cover from the air.
In addition to these diffcultics, the climate and its consequent cffcct on the rivers must be realised. During the summer months the mountains are clear of snow, but the river valleys are often flooded, and the valleys of any largc streams like the Liao Ho become almost a moms. Heavy rain storms may be expected between June and August.
There arc no roads as uriderstood in the " Great War." The best one available in the peninsula was the Port Arthur-Liao Yang Road, which ran vib Fuchou, and was at this point some way from the railway, and therefore not in thc direct linc of advance to Telissu.
Being thickly populated there were, of coursc, numberless village tracks, but these were very bad and only suitable for the light country traffic in small rough vehicles.
SITUATIOK.
In Junc, 1904, as far as affects the 2nd Army, the situation was briefly as follows :-The 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions and 1st Cavalry Brigade were on the linc Puhntien-Pitzuwo.
The Russians had been driven back from Nanshan and were enclosed in the Port Arthur enceinte watched by the 1st Division.
The Japancsc objective was to concentrate every available man at Liao Yang and defeat the Russians thcrc before they became any stronger, the and, 4th and 1st Army each operating along a different road and widely separated. The nature of thecommunications absolutely prevented greater concentration. ' The Russian plan, on thc other hand, was wavering, as General Kuropatkin wanted to wait reinforcements before fighting, and Admiral When allotted to him tlic Cavalry Brigadc was already marching south to reoccupy certain portions of the railway line. Its strength was about 1,600 sabres, IOO rifles and 6 guns.
No attempt is made to give more than tlic bare bones of the actual operations. Anyone interested can find them in detail in either Part I.
of the Official History of the Russo-Japanese War or thc German account of Wafang Koo, the other name for Tclissu.
NARRATIVE.
General O h , Commanding 2nd Army, had heard rumou? of this proposed southern offcnsive, and on 30th May had sent forward the wholc of the cavalry (1st Cavalry Brigade) to reconnoitre to the north of \Va Fang Tien, and on the afternoon of this day both sides were approaching Telissu.
The combat resulting in this meeting was the first fight at Telissu, and opposing forces remained in touch with daily skimishes and minor combats until 3rd June, when the Japanese Commander, having obtained sufficient information, ordered the withdrawal of the Cavalry Brigade, with the infantry and artillery he had sent to their support, leaving patrols only in observation.
On the other hand, the Russians had learnt from the presence of the supporting artillery that it was very probable stronger Japanese forces were in the ncighbourhood.
DISCUSSION.
This was purely a struggle for information. What possibilities does the present and future hold for us in such a situation 1
Telissu is only roughly 30 miles from Pulanticn along the railway, and for most of this distance the railway mns one side or other of the Hsiung Yao Shan ridge-the main road, as had been said, running N.W. to Fuchou or away from the railway.
W i l l such a cavalry operation in similar conditions be necessary or not?
As regards the air it is unlikely that at such an early stage either side would have obtained anything approaching mastery. I t would have been thc vdle of low-flying aircraft to obtain the tactical information required, and for thc flights of the higlicr command to rcconnoitrc thc rail movements and concentrations, perhaps as far as Liao Yang itself. Now, in country such as has been describcd, provided the hostile troops took full advantage of tlie cover afforded by viIlagcs, crops, woods, and the slope of the ground, it would appear practically impossible for the most careful and daring low fliers to obtain anything but the vagucst information.
Land troops, tliereforc, as indicated in F.S.R. II., would bc essential, and the rule of ' I Fight to learn " applics.
This being. so, what possibilities do the tank and annoured car offer 3
The distancc to and from Tclissu is well within the radius of the modcrn tank as describcd abovc, or armoured car, in a day, even allowing for skirmishes with tlic hostile screen. In this case the Japancsc desired information as to whether the Russians were on thc move fonvard and, if so, how near they had got.
It is suggcsted, ffiereforc. always remembering the nature of the country, and that as it was necessary to support the cavalry reconnaissance with infantry and guns, that the future solution of such problem will be by tlic dcspatcli of forcc composed somewhat as bclow.
On the Fuchou road, a company of armoured cars supported by two companies of infantry and Stokcs' mortar battery on lorries, and two sections of mechanically-drawn field artillery. Tlic latter to afford protection should tlic rcconnaissance mect fast moving tanks or with guns.
For the main rcconnaissancc on Tclissu, whcre the tracks arc unfavourablc for cars: onc battalion of tanks supported and assisted by two regiments of cavalry and a battery of liorsc artillcry.
It may bc argued, use either cavalry or tanks, but do not mix thcm, cspccially as a tank w i l l move faster than cavalry.
It is submitted, howcvcr, that in such a theatre a combination will producc thc bcst results.
Much of thc country, owing to woods on the hills and thc wct closc cultivation of the valleys, would be impassiiblc to tanks.
L o m c s carrying infantry would not be ablc to move fast, if a t all, along the tracks, and tlie result would be that the tank without support would have a limitcd zone of activity, and bc liable to surprise and dcfcat from anti-tank defences.
On the other hand cavalry alone might easily be held up by machine guns in thc villages and at tlic crossings of tlie numberless nullahs and streams, cvcn if hostile tanks were not encountered. ' Going further into detail, it is suggested that a suitable disposition for such reconnoitring force along the railway would bc :-Cavalry.-One regiment on each side of the railway, forming a screcn covcring ff ie front required, with duc proportion (one-and-a-half to two squadrons) kept in hand to fight. AriiUcry.--hloving with the main body of the tanks in vicinity of the railway.
Tanks.-Hcadquartcrs, Wireless Section, and two companies along tllc railway or its vicinity. One company on the right supporting thc cavalry on their flank-a wirelcss tank to accompany this section. Thc left fiank is to a certain extent covered by the forcc on the Fuchou road, with which it would bc in wireless touch.
There is another solution, however, of this first problem which is pcrhaps worthy of consideration-always remembering the characteristics of the theatre.
If an enemy is kcpt continually under observation hc cannot carry out a surprisc. Hence tlic ideal outpost is one where thc enemy is picquetted and conscquently always under observation. Thc ncw tanks and armoured cars appear to offer facilities for this.
I t is suggcsted that where, as in this case, tlic front is restricted, tlic possible lines of advance for large bodies limited, and thc natural obstacles considerable, tlic Commander would be justified in using a very large proportion of his tanks and armoured cars in a far distant line of obscrvation, espccially as he could be constantly in touch with it by wireless.
If this argument is accepted it is suggcsted that under conditions of the near future, the 2nd Japancse Army would have had an outpost line of armoured cars and tanks extending from the Pili-Ho, east of Telissu, thence to Telissu, and so down the Fuchou 110, stiffened at particularly dangerous points by infantry and guns.
It must not IJC forgotten also that with 11.T. large bodies of infantry can be moved rapidly, and that tanks can easily drive in an ordinary outpost line. It seems, therefore, that, as the second duty of the outpost line is to delay the enemy long enough to enable thc main body to get into its position to fight, and that whereas thc time required for the occupation of a battle position cannot be materially reduced, thc outpost to fulfil their duty must either bc placed farther away or on the line of some natural feature which affords an efficient obstacle to tanks and mechanically transported infantry.
It may be urged that tanks are not much use at night, and owing to increased air observations, surprise attacks will be morc and more carried out'under thc cover of darkness. In such cases, however, thc outpost tanks will have bccn able to reconnoitre and possibly mark their particular area, and so distinctly have the advantage of any attackers.
Lastly, thc only effective mobilc weapon against tanks are tanks and guns, so it appcars that for adequate protection in futurc the outpost line must bc strongly supportcd by these weapons, even if the argument as to distance is not accepted.
NARRATIVE-CO?flblWd.
As a result of certain orders and information, the G.O.C. 2nd Army was free from the 4th Junc to prevent General Stakelbcrg's advance, and, in fact, to advance himself in accordance with thc general scheme. At this time Ids forcc consisted of tlircc divisions and a Naval contingent of 1,500 all ranks, and six field guns. Tfic advance was dclaycd owing to thc trains not yet having bccn discmbarked.
'rhc Russians tinder-cstimatcd this forcc in the most cxtrnordinary way, and General Stakelberg rcccivcd ordcrs on the 7th Junc to advancc and capture Nan-Shan. This order was madc more difficult of acconiplishrncnt by the Commander-in-Chief rcfusing to allow Gcncral Stakelberg to concentratc what forces lie had.
It is obvious, of coursc, that with modern facilities of observation this false appreciation could hardy have becn made by the Russians. Tiic Japmesc, on tlic narrow Pulantien-Pitzuwo position, must havc discloscd their considerable strength to thc air. Directly thc Japanese G.H.Q. realiscd the Russians wcrc committed to this advancc all the otlicr armies wcrc ordered t o carry out activc opcrations with the object, wlrich was successful, of weakening the Russian ' cffort.
The Navy also co-opcrated in bombarding the coast as far north as Kai Ping, and obtained information as to tlic Russian movcmciits.
On the 7th the Russians had their outposts on tlic line Ma-ChuantzuHsiao-Chia-Chcn-Chi Chiatun, with abo indcpcndcnt posts furthcr out. This is about a 30-milc front, and watched all thc Japanese approaches. The reasoning as to usc of cars and tanks in distant observation line applies also to this situation.
Between the 9th and tlic 11th cavalry rcconnaissanccs obtained accurate information as to tlie extcnt and nature of the Russian force, and that in certain places the outposts were strengthcncd by infantry. On the other hand the Russian information was indifferent, and thus although the withdrawal of Japanesc ships relieved one anxiety it was not till the 12th that General Stakelberg was permitted to conccntratc his command.
Thc comments on the previous rcconnaissaiicc applies t o thosc opcrations also. Eithcr side, making full use of and properly handling tanks available under modem conditions, could have driven in the opposing outposts and obtained still bctter information.
Gcncral Stakelberg still under-estimated thc numbcrs against him. On the Iath of Junc General Oku's trains had arrived, and on the 13th his advance had begun.
On that date, moving in tlircc divisional columns, the 2nd Army reachcd thc line Tai Ping Chuang,, Kuan Chiatun, Wuchia Tun(s), and at 7 p.m. ordcrs werc issued for the advance next day.
The lincs of advance arc givcn on the maps; the instruction was to drive back thc cncmy with the 3rd and 5th Divisions, wldc the 4th moved vid Fuchou to operate against the cncmy's right and p a r d against any advance along the main road.
Gcneral Stakcibcrg, on the other hand, had given up the offensive, and decided to await thc Japanese in a position lie had selected south of l'elissu.
He again incorrectly appreciated the position and disposed his troops so that he had a wliolc division and four batteries to the east, and ;L weak brigade, two batteries and the bulk of his cavalry to the west of the railway, whereas the Japanese had two divisions to the west and one division and a cavalry brigade to the east. Three regiments of infantry were still on the train coming up to the Russians.
On the 14th the Japancsc moved as ordered. Dispositions and moves are shown on the map.
On this morning Gcncral Oh, Commanding the 2nd Army, heard that the 6th Division had disembarked some troops, and he ordered them on to Lntzu Shan at once. By a p.m. the 3rd and 5th Divisions had pushed in all the enemy's advanced troops and a heavy artillery duel started; under cover of this the Russian position from Ta Fang Slien to Lung Wang hliao was reconnoitred. At 3 p.m. the duel w a s at its height, but, although the Russians had disclosed thereby the wholc of their artillcry, the Japanese 3rd Divisional Artillcry only had conic into act ion.
About this time the right of the Japanese attacked without success the Russians about IVa Fang \Vopu ; the latter were reinforced and the attack w a s repulsed. General Stakclberg received a verbal report of this about 3 p.m. on visiting this area.
No important succcss was gained, and at sunset t h e 3rd and 5th Divisions held a line running from Ssu Chia-Cho through Lung Chi3
Tow to Wuchia Tun. Headquarters llcanwhile General Stakclbcrg, with a quite incorrect appreciation of the situation in his head, returned to Telissu and moved his reserve out to his left with orders to comc under General Glasko's control.
This erroneous appreciation could not have been formed if modern facilities of air observation wcre available. Although no reports of engagements west of thc railway had been received, low-flying aeroplanes would surely have located the 5th Division, and perhaps the 4th Division also.
FIowcver, Gcncral Stakelbcrg decided on a counterstroke on the 15th, and as a result of his movements had three-quarters of his force east of the railway, and his only available reserves were still coming up by train.
General Oku, on the other hand, decided the enemy were weaker than his force, although being constantly reinforced by rail. Orders were therefore sent out at 11 p.m. for further attack on the morrow. The moves consequent are indicated on the map.
General O h also reduced his reserves to two regiments by returning one regiment to the 5th Division. The leading troops of the 6th Division, however, might bc shortly expected. His plan was to attack the left It is necessary here to consider tlie topography of the battle field.
In front of the 2nd Army position lies a line of hills rising GOO ft. to 1,000 ft. above the valleys, blocking the view beyond and 'about 2,000 yards north of it lay tlic main Russian position. The range of hills lics likc a scrccn before tlie position, and almost entirely hides all movements behind it. The railway, road and Hou Tou river pass through a gap in this line of hills, the boundaries of the gap rising in two bare steep peaks. The gap extends for about half a mile, and of the same length, narrowing in the centre to about a quarter of a mile. The hills on either side are inacccssiblc to field artillery. To the west and at the cxtrcrnity of tlic range is another and larger gap through wllicli the Fuchou Ho runs. Directly behind the railway gap and covering it runs out tlie Lung Wang U a o spur, and between the two are villages surrounded by large trees. This spur was the main artillery position of the Russians. North-castward from the eastern boundary peak of the railway gap, the position follows a curve of commanding points to Fei Chia Tun. Here were trenches and gun pits. The valley of the Fu Cliou Ho is flat, open and heavily cultivated, and very gradually narrows to Telissu. In this valley connecting the right and Lung Wang AIiao were infantry trenches and gun pits, while the main line on the right ran along a well defined feature N. of N.W. of Ta Fang Shcn.
From west to east the position measured about eight and a half miles.
A heavy mist a t dawn in the Hou Tou and Fucliou valleys enabled the Japanese infantry, who had started a t midnight, to get to the Russian position.
A t 5.25 a.m. the weather cleared and the artillery opened. During the night the Russians had made some alteration in their tactical dispositions and were ready to ,attack on their extreme left. Orders, howevcr, for the attack were late, and considerablc misunderstandings arose owing to some vagueness in their expression, the result being the attack by General Glasko, which was to have started between I and 2 a.m., had not started at dawn. More delay occurred after the Japanese artillery opened, for the matter was still being discussed by the Commanders concerned. \\'lien eventually orders were issucd to advance, a vague order was received from General .Stakclberg giving instructions for a withdrawal if the Japanese advanced, or for a halt if they retired.
General Gcmgross, however, had advanced bctwccn 7 and 8 a.m., and progressed slowly, and pinned the Japanese to the rough trenches they had thrown up at night.
The 5th Division, while this action was in progress, had got on well, and when it was realised that the 3rd Division were being attacked, the advance was pushcd with even inore vigour, with the result that by 10 a.m. Tafang Shen and the heights above it Iiad been definitely captured.
As a result of this, artillery fire was concentrated on the Lung Wang Mia0 position and the Russian artillery silenced and knocked out. The 4th Division troops were now beginning to comc into action and had got touch with the 5th Division near Yang Chia Tun at g a.m. General Stakelberg's cfforts, on hearing of the situation, to reinforce this flank were quite unavailing. His communications were, of course, bad, but there were unnecessary delays and other faults. At 11.30 a general order to retire was given, and about mid-day the retreat on thc right began.
Meanwhile the attack on the 3rd Division had no success though pressed home, and shortly after 10 a.m. the right of General Gemgross's force camc under flanking fire from the 5th Division. As a result about noon orders were given for a withdrawal on this sector also.
The 3rd Division resumed the offensive and, securing the' railway gap, the artillery advanced and occupied the Lung Wang AIiao spur and so commanded the valley to the north.
About 2 p.m., two battalions of Russian infantry arrived by train and detraining at a siding were of marked assistance in checking the Japanesc turning movement. Added to this a heavy rainstorm camc o,n at 3 p.m. which effectively blinded thc Japancsc artillery and materially assisted the Russians to get away.
The Japanese did not follow up their victory, ammunition was running short, and the ground near and beyond Telissu was unsuited for cavalry action. Two squadrons only wcre sent north and behind them outposts wcrc established. Thus thc attempt to relieve Port Arthur was a signal failure.
CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBILITIES. Now accepting the general plan adopted by each leader it is for consideration what use could have been madc of the air and mechanical weapons. As regards the air service much comment is not required, except a prcpared position should gcncrally be obvious in the photographs taken, although in a scrub-covered country a well trained arniy would doubtless be very hard to locate from the air.
On the other hand to attack requires movement, and troops on the move, cvcn in such difficult country, are far more likely to be spotted. As regards actual attacks froin thc air, attackers would bc likely to suffer more severely than the defenders in this country, but once the rctreat commenced great damage could be done to the retiring troops forced to pass through the defiles north of Telissu.
Turning to the r6Ze of the tanks and armoured car units, the possibilities are not so easy to explore.
A detailed study of a map (large scale) brings out the fact that behind whole of the country along and immcdiatcly behind the Russian left is similarly rugged.
The Japanese cavalry also were unable to pursue, although it is estrcmcly probable a cavalry force similar to the Dcscrt Xounted Corps in Palestine would have got further.
Leaving the ground out of considcration for the monicnt, it is for decision whether the tanks available can be morc profitably used to co-opcrate. with the infantry on the divisiond fronts, br acting independently to brcak thc enemy's line at somc point and so facilitate the advance elsewvhcrc, or lastly to be saved to esploit succcss and complete the destruction of thc enemy.
<
Tile tank being essentially an offcnsivc wcapon, it may be anticipated that thc defenders' tanks will be uscd entirely for a counter-attack, or to engage the tanks attacking with the infantry.
In a battlc like this, still without considering topography, no continuous defensive lines will be mct, and the defence will consist of a series of defended localitics. It would appear better, therefore, provided no exceptional preparation has bccn madc, to use as fcw a s possible of the tank units with thc infantry, and cvcn thesc as a reserve of powcr to overcome unforcsccn difficulties and to keep the bulk to rush fonvard and inlmcdiatcly exploit success. To do this their location in thc battle arca will have to be most carcfully sclcctcd.
The immediate exploitation of success is always dificult even with thc bcst amngcmcnts, but the mobility and fire powcr of the tank should rcndcr it peculiarly effective for this purpose. The minutes of wonderful possibility just after a successful assault fly only too quickly, and at such a time a rapid advance by tanks should reap enormous benefits. They cannot, of course, bc lcft cntircly by themsclvcs, but should be followed and accompanied by any otlier troops on foot or horse that are availablc. . I t is wry easy for a tank to capture, but very hard for it to hold or maintain an aclvantagc won. Now, turning to the actual ground and applying the above arguments. It will be seen that ccntrc and left only offer possibilities for the bcst use of tanks. It is suggested, therefore, the allocation should bc somewhat as fOllO\VS :-Attached to thc 3rd Division.-Two companies to assist the infantry in dealing with defended villages.
With thc 5th Division.-One battalion, thcir r81e being to exploit succcss in the ccntrc and along the valley. One company of this battalion might be attached to the infantry to assist in the capture of dcfended villages, the primary v6l.9, however, being to rush fonvard and over the defences immcdiatcly after the assault. With the 4th Division.-Here some difference with the plan adopted for the actual battle is suggested.
About 20 miles north of Telissu and 30 miles from Fuchou the main Port Arthur-Liao Yang road meets the railway along which, in the event of defeat, the Russians would. retire.
I t is suggested that only one brigade of infantry and a proportion of 4th Division artillery would be ordered to support and co-operate with the 5th Division against the Russian right. The remainder of the Division should be held ready with the necessary R1.T. to "embus" directly the battle was won. With them would be two brigades of tanks and two armoured car companies. The r6le of this force would be to liead off the retreating army at the junction of road and railway and hold them until the main body, following up their success, would arrive. Special precautions by air will be necessary to protect this operation and ensure surprise.
If successful this would ensure the capture or destruction of the whole cnemy.force, and even if only partially so would drive them off the road into the hilly country to the east.
Or if it arrived too late at the junction, it would still be in position to continue a close and merciless pursuit.
The remaining armoured car company would remain in G.H.Q. Reserve to be attached to the cavalry operating on the right flank if the tracks were found passable.
The 4th Division Commander in allotting his troops would, of course, take special care to ensure that the tanks always had an adequate reserve, so that the crcws could be rested without having to break off the fight once touch was gained.
In open warfare it will always be difficult to foresee for certain what localities are most likely to hold up the infantry ; considering the handling of the tanks with the 3rd Division in more detail, it is therefore suggested that no definite allotment of frontage within the Division should be given.
The advance guard might be allotted two sections to move by bounds between the van and main guard and operate outwards when the protecting troops have been driven in, to assist in locating and fixing the enemy's flanks.
The remainder of the tanks, i .~. , two companies less two sections, should be kept under control of the Divisional Commander, to be utilised as and when it was seen definitely that any locality was holding up the advance.
With the 5th Division the possibilities are more definite, certain villages and localities will obviously be organised as strong points, and it is desirable to make certain of breaking tlirougli rapidly.
I t is suggested, therefore, that one company should be definitely allotted the r6le of leading the infantry on through the villages-one section detailed to assist in the capture of the hill to the west of the railway gap as far as it is scaleable on its western side, and the remainder, moving by bounds, follow up so as to be able to immediately exploit the success
